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IARTICLES I
Israel, Iran and Preemption: Choosing




"Just wars," according to Grotius, "arise from our love of the
innocent."' Recognizing this, the State of Israel - now facing the
growing threat of unconventional aggression2 from Iran' - may
* Ph.D. Princeton (1971); Professor of International Law at Purdue
University.
1. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 70 (William
Whewell trans., 1853) (1625). Grotius is generally recognized as the founder of
modem international law.
2. For the crime of aggression, see Resolution on the Definition ofAggression,
Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, at 142,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974). For pertinent
codifications of the criminalization of aggression, see also the Kellogg-Briand
Peace Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57; U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, 4; 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 374 (1966); 1970 U.N. General Assembly
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1971); 1972 Declaration on the Non-use of Force in International Relations and
Permanent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 2936, 27 U.N.
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soon have to consider exercising the preemption option.4 This
option, founded upon the imperative to protect its innocent civilian
populations from new forms of genocide,' could surely meet the
test of a "just war.",
6
GAOR, Supp. No. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Resolution Affirming the Principles of
International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A.
Res. 95 (1), 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). See also Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No.
881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19; Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 5, 70
U.N.T.S. 237; Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, chs.
II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol of Amend-
ment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter Protocol of
Buenos Aires]; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62
Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Pact]; American
Treaty on Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 [hereinafter Pact of
Bogota]; Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts. II, III,
479 U.N.T.S. 39.
3. See, e.g., Yedidya Atlas, Iran - An Islamic Threat, MIDSTREAM, 1992, at
2-7; Louis Rend Beres, Blind Confidence, THE JERUSALEM REP., at 54 ("View-
point"); Louis Rend Beres, The Real Bases of Middle East Instability, MIDSTREAM,
June-July 1992, at 9-10; Louis Rend Beres, Israeli Security and Self-Reliance after
the Cold War: Geopolitical Imperatives, Strategic Considerations and Tactical
Options, Speech at Security Regimes: Israel and its Neighbors, Bar-Ilan Center for
Strategic Studies (1992).
4. Preemption, of course, has figured importantly in prior Israeli strategic
calculations. This is especially apparent in the wars of 1956 and 1967, and in the
destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. Significantly, it was the failure to
preempt in October 1973 that contributed to heavy Israeli losses on the Egyptian
and Syrian fronts during the Yom Kippur War, and-indeed-almost brought
about Israeli defeat.
5. War and genocide are not mutually exclusive. War might well be the
means whereby genocide is undertaken. According to Articles II and III of the
Genocide Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 1951, genocide
includes any of several acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such .... ." See Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S.
277. It follows that where Israel is recognized as the institutionalized expression
of the Jewish People (an expression that includes national, ethnical, racial and
religious components), acts of war intended to destroy the Jewish State could
assuredly be genocidal. Regarding such intentions, much of the current Islamic
world, Iran in particular, seeks Israel's forcible destruction. In the words of
Islamic Jihad, the Iranian-backed terrorist group claiming responsibility for the
March 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires: "The war is open
until Israel ceases to exist and until the last JEW in the world is eliminated ....
Israel is all evil and should be wiped out of existence." Nadim Ladki, Islamic Jihad
Vows More Attacks on Israel, Mar. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Current File (emphasis added).
6. In terms of international law, such a war would exhibit the characteristics
of anticipatory self defense. For jurisprudential clarification by this author of this
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II. The Danger from Iran
Israel faces substantial danger of unconventional attack from
Iran. In a few short years, or sooner, this danger could include
nuclear attack. The sources of this danger lie in the Teheran
regime's development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons7
and in its fundamentally theological/political commitment to
destruction of the Jewish State. This congruence of capabilities and
intentions portends a uniquely major war in the Middle East.
In addition to its ongoing purchase of nuclear infrastructure
from China, North Korea and Russia, Iran has an ambitious,
indigenous nuclear program. Centered at ten widely dispersed
sites,8 this program begins at Tabriz, in the north, continues
through the large installation at Isfahan, and concludes in the
nuclear facility at Busheir on the Persian Gulf. Named the "Death
Program" by Iran, it receives much of its direction from Pakistan.9
According to the distinguished Israeli observer Arie Stav: "Abdel
concept, with particular reference to Israel, see Louis Rend Beres, After the Gulf
War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 259-80
(1991); Louis Rend Beres, Striking 'First': Israel's Post Gulf War Options Under
International Law, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1-24 (1991); Louis Rend
Beres, Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89-99
(1991); Louis Rend Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine,' and
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71-104 (1992). For an
examination of assassination as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense by
Israel, see Louis Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The
Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321-340 (1991).
7. See, e.g., the discussion of Iran and weapons of mass destruction in The
Threat of North Korean Nuclear Proliferation: Hearings Before Comm. on Foreign
Affairs and Subcomm. on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st & 2nd
Sess. (1991) (testimony of Gary Milhollin, Director, Wisc. Proj; on Arms Control);
HOUSE REP. RES. COMM. TASK FORCE ON TERR. AND UNCONVEN. WARFARE,
IRAN'S STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, at 12 (1992); HOUSE REP. RES.
COMM. TASK FORCE ON TERR. AND UNCONVEN. WARFARE, IRAN'S NUCLEAR
WEAPONS-UPDATE II, at 5 (1992); DARREN H. DONNELLY & ZACHARY S.
DAVIS, IRAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 13,
CRS Issue Brief (Library of Congress, 1992); SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T. AFF., 4
PROLIFERATION WATCH, No. 3, No. 5 (1993); ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, AFTER
THE STORM: THE CHANGING MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 416-27
(1993); GERALD M. STEINBERG, ARMS CONTROL AND ISRAELI NATIONAL
SECURITY: A REALISTIC APPROACH (1993); Doyle McManus, The New,
Dangerous Dominoes, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1994, at A14; Kenneth R. Timmerman,
Iran: Ever More Threatening, 1 NAT'L SEC. Q. 30-33 (1993); Weapons of Mass
Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya, MEDNEWS, Aug. 1992.
8. A tactical problem for Israel from the standpoint of preemption.
9. See ARIE STAV, 6 THE ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: ON THE THRESHOLD OF CRITICAL MASS 17 (1992).
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Kader Khan, responsible for the development of the Pakistani
Bomb, is chief adviser to the Iranian Nuclear Energy Commission,
and Iranian technicians receive their training in Islamabad."' To
a considerable extent, the problem lies in religion.
Theologically, any sort of peace settlement with Israel is seen
as an intolerable affront to Islam and a negation of Iran's Islamic
identity." As for territorial compromise over "Palestine," this,
too, is out of the question. Because a Muslim land in the heart of
dar al-Islam" can be ruled properly only by Muslim authority,
Israel's "usurpation" of any Arab land must be met with jihad."
Described by the current Islamic regime in Teheran as a poisonous
growth in the Middle East, Israel is approached as a malignancy,
not because of its particular policies, but because it is a Jewish
state. Short of ceasing to exist, there is absolutely nothing Israel
can do to achieve peace with Iran.
To implement its genocidal strategy against Israel, Iran is
already at war with the Jewish State. This war is in the form of an
insurgency utilizing the Hezbollah terrorist organization in the
Bekaa.14 Representing the active terror arm of Iran, Hezbollah




12. The dar al-Islam, the abode of Islam, is discussed in great detail in
ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED 222-305 (1991).
Here it is essential to understand that Iran's hatred of Israel derives from alleged
and irremediable historical misdeeds of Jews against Islam, the revival of the blood
libel by Muslims, Islamic denuniciations of the Talmud and the carefully contrived
demonic image of a ruthless, oppressive Jewish State. Promulgated by fundamen-
talist terror groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, this hatred makes no
distinctions between Jews, Judaism, and Israel. All are seen, as Wistrich points
out, "as part of a global conspiracy to create an alien body in the heart of the
Muslim world.... ." Id. at 223.
13. Jihad, or holy war, is discussed widely in WISTRICH, supra note 12, at
ch.16. For fundamentalist Muslims, Wistrich points out, ".... peace with Israel was
and still remains nothing less than a poison threatening the life-blood of Islam, a
symptom of its profound malaise, weakness and decadence." Id. at 227.
According to Islamic orthodoxy, the Prophet is said to have predicted a final war
to annihilate the Jews. See ARAB THEOLOGIANS ON JEWS AND ISRAEL:
EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE
ACADEMY OF ISLAMIC RESEARCH 9 (D.F. Green ed., 1976). Mohammed, it is
reported, had stated: "The hour (i.e., salvation) will not come until you fight
against the Jews; and the stone would say '0 Muslim! There is a Jew behind me:
come and kill him,"' Id. at 51; WISTRICH, supra note 12, at 230.
14. In this part of Lebanon, Islamic terror groups, aided by Syria and Iran,
exert constant military pressure on Israel's northern borders.
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Iran is also behind the marked escalation of Hamas terrorism
against Israeli targets. Although, historically Iran has favored the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a staunchly pro-Shiite organization, a
distinct tilt toward Hamas took place after the 1991 Gulf War.
Moreover, Hamas has been exploring new avenues of cooperation
with Hezboflah, with the latter now establishing a Hamas liason
office in southern Lebanon.
For Iran, however, terrorist attacks upon Israel are only the
opening salvo of a much greater war, a "softening" strategy that
weakens the Jewish State for subsequent direct assault. Such
assaults, if Iran is left unchecked, could exhibit chemical, biological
or even nuclear forms of aggression. Because massive and uncon-
ventional first-strikes against Israel could prevent an unacceptably
damaging reprisal, Israel may have little choice but to strike first in
its own essential defense.
III. Strategic and Tactical Considerations of an Israeli Preemp-
tion
But would preemption by Israel be strategically and tactically
cost effective? This, of course, would depend upon a number of
critical variables, including: (a) expected probability of Iranian first-
strikes; (b) expected disutility of Iranian first-strikes; 5 (c) expect-
ed schedule of Iranian unconventional weapons deployment; (d)
expected efficiency of Iranian active defenses over time; 6 (e)
expected efficiency of Israeli active defenses over time; (f) expected
efficiency of Israeli hard-target counterforce operations over time;
15. On Israel's nuclear weapons see generally, SHLOMO ARONSON, THE
POLITIcs AND STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
OPACITY, THEORY AND REALITY, 1960-1991 (1992); FRANK BARNABY, THE
INVISIBLE BOMB: THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1989);
Louis RENIt BERES, SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
STRATEGY (1986); MCGEORGE BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL: CHOICES
ABOUT THE BOMB IN THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS (1988); YAIR EVRON, ISRAEL'S
NUCLEAR DILEMMA (Hakibbutz Hameuchad ed., 1987); SEYMOUR M. HERSCH,
THE SAMSON OPTION: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY (1991); TAYSIR NASHIF, NUCLEAR WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
DIMENSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1984); PIERRE PEAN, LES DEUX BOMBES
(1982); LEONARD S. SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB (1988).
16. Israeli judgments concerning preemption must take into account, inter alia,
Iranian anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) developments. If, for example, such
developments should permit Iran to intercept a pertinent fraction of Israeli
offensive missiles, Israel's cost-benefit calculations on preemption could be
transformed significantly. Correspondingly, should Israel's own ATBM
developments suggest optimism about interception reliability, the cost-effectiveness
of an Israeli preemption would likely be enhanced.
1996]
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(g) expected reactions of other regional enemies (e.g., Syria); and
(h) expected world community reactions to Israeli preemptions.17
Reduced to its essential dimensions, Israel's dilemma is this:
Should it plan for anticipatory self-defense18 attacks against
Iranian unconventional forces at all,19 and, if it should, precisely
when should these attacks be mounted? Where it is assumed that
Iran will only be adding to its chemical, biological and nuclear
arsenals, and that these additions will make effective Israeli
preemptions more and more problematic? Rational strategy would
seem to compel Jerusalem to act defensively as soon as possible.'
17. The expected world community reactions to an Israeli preemption against
Iran could play a major role in Jerusalem's decisional calculations. If, after all,
these reactions would likely be very hostile - as indeed, they are apt to be in the
midst of a so-called "Peace Process" - Israel would have some good reason not
to preempt. This is especially the case with regard to probable negative reactions
from Washington, as Israel depends so heavily upon American support and
security guarantees.
18. See also, HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND
BOOTY (1604):
Now, as Cicero explains, this [justification for preemption] exists
whenever he who chooses to wait [for formal declarations] will be
obliged to pay an unjust penalty before he can exact a just penalty; and,
in a general sense, it exists whenever matters do not admit of delay.
Thus it is obvious that a just war can be waged in return, without
recourse to judicial procedure, against an opponent who has begun an
unjust war; nor will any declaration of that just war be required ....
For-as Aelian says, citing Plato as his authority-any war undertaken
for the necessary repulsion of injury, is proclaimed not by a crier nor by
a herald but by the voice of Nature herself.
See HUGO GROTIUS, DE IURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS 96 (James Brown Scott
ed. & Gladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel tran., Oceana Publications 1964).
19. The customary right of anticipatory self-defense has its modern origins in
the Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper
Canada against British rule (a rebellion that aroused sympathy and support in the
United States). See Beth M. Polebaum, National Self Defense in International
Law: An Emerging Standard For a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 187, 190-91
(1984) (noting that the Caroline case transformed the right to self-defense from an
excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine). Following this incident, the
serious threat of armed attack has generally justified militarily defensive action.
In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States
and Great Britain, then United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined
a framework for self-defense that did not require an actual attack. See id. at 191;
R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938).
Here the framework permitted military response to a threat so long as the danger
posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation." See id.; 61 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1843), reprinted in Jennings,
supra, at 89.
20. This is because-any undue delay could impair Israel's tactical capacity for
preemptive action. What this means is that incremental Iranian dispersion of
unconventional weapons assets would make it progressively more difficult for
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If, however, it is assumed that there will be no significant enlarge-
ment or deployment of Iranian unconventional weapons over time,
this may suggest a diminished rationale for Israel to strike first.
Critical considerations here would include Israeli assumptions about
Iranian rationality, expectations about costs to Israel of Iranian
aggression in the near term;21 comparisons of costs to Israel of
Iranian near-term aggression with those of Iranian reprisals to
Israeli preemption;22 and projected efficacy over time of Israeli
and Iranian ATBM operations. 3
More than any other factor, expected rationality of Iranian
decision-makers will figure in Israeli judgments on the preemption
option. If, after all, these leaders were expected to strike at Israel
with unconventional forces irrespective of anticipated Israeli
counterstrikes, deterrence, by definition, would be immobilized.
This means that Iranian strikes could be expected even if Iran
understood that Israel had "successfully" deployed its own nuclear
weapons in altogether survivable modes, that Israel's weapons were
Israel to destroy pertinent targets without incurring unacceptable risks of chemi-
cal/biological/nuclear retaliation. It is conceivable, of course, that Israel's
preemption window of opportunity is already closed. If this is the case, Israel's
only remaining security hopes are contingent upon successful deterrence and upon
the absence of irrational decision-makers in Teheran.
21. These expectations refer to particular harms predicted to accrue to Israel
from Iranian aggression in the next several years. If such harms were predictably
"low," Israel's incentive to preempt would likely also be "low." If, however, such
harms were predictably "high," Israel's preemption imperative would likely be
correspondingly "high."
22. Should Israel decide to preempt Iranian attacks with conventional strikes,
Teheran's response would largely determine Jerusalem's next moves. If this
response were in any way nuclear, Israel would assuredly resort to nuclear
counterretaliation. If this retaliation were to involve chemical and/or biological
weapons, Israel might also feel pressed to take the escalatory initiative. Should
the Iranian response to Israel's nonnuclear preemption be limited to hard-target
conventional strikes, it is most unlikely that the Jewish State would move on to
nuclear counterretaliations. If, however, the Iranian conventional retaliation were
all-out and directed toward civilian populations as well as to military targets, an
Israeli nuclear counterretaliation could not be ruled out. It would appear that
such a counterretaliation could be ruled out only if the enemy conventional
retaliation were entirely proportionate to Israel's preemption, confined exclusively
to Israeli hard targets, circumscribed by the legal limitations of military necessity
and accompanied by explicit/validated assurances of nonescalatory intent.
23. This refers to comparative expectations concerning capacity to intercept
incoming ballistic missiles. Moreover, such comparisons of efficacy must be
projected over time, as Israeli judgments could be affected by differential and
incremental development of ATBM operations. For example, if Israel expected
Iranian ATBM capabilities to increase more rapidly than its own ATBM
capabilities, this could enhance Israel's incentive to preempt.
1996]
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altogether capable of penetrating Iranian active defenses, and that
Israel's leaders were altogether willing to retaliate.
2 4
IV. The Problem of Reliance Upon Nuclear Deterrence
To fully understand the risks of Israeli reliance upon nuclear
weapons for deterrence, one must first understand the inherent
logic of that method of producing national security. To deter
enemy attack, in this case by Iran, Israel must be able to prevent
that enemy, by threat of an unacceptably damaging reprisal, from
deciding to strike.' Here, security would be sought by convincing
the prospective attacker that the costs of a considered attack will
exceed the expected benefits. Assuming that Israel's enemies (1)
always value self-preservation more highly than any other prefer-
ence or combination of preferences; and (2) always choose
rationally between alternative options, they will, barring accidental
or unauthorized firings, always refrain from attacking an Israel that
is believed willing and able to deliver an appropriately destructive
response.
Two factors must communicate such a belief. First, in terms
of ability, there are two essential components: payload and delivery
system. It must be successfully communicated to the prospective
attacker by Israel that the Jewish State's firepower, and the means
of delivering that firepower, are capable of wreaking unacceptable
levels of retaliatory destruction after a first-strike attack. This
means that Israel's retaliatory forces must appear sufficiently
invulnerable and sufficiently elusive to penetrate the prospective
attacker's active and civil defenses. It need not be communicated
to the potential attacker that such firepower and/or the means of
delivery are superior. The capacity to deter need not be as great
as the capacity to win.
The second factor of communication for Israel is willingness.
How may Israel convince potential attackers that it possesses the
24. The perceived willingness to retaliate is ordinarily essential to credible
deterrence. Hence, if Israel were to face only rational adversaries, their
perception of substantially invulnerable Israeli retaliatory (including nuclear)
forces and of Israeli decision-makers willing to unleash these forces, would deter
them from striking first. If, however, Israel were to face irrational adversaries,
such as might possibly be expected in Iran, even such perceptions of Israeli force
invulnerability and decisional willingness could fail to deter.
25. This is the very essence of nuclear deterrence. For more on such
deterrence in general, and in regard to Israel in particular, see Louis RENI
BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (1980);
BERES, supra note 15.
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resolve to deliver an unacceptably destructive retaliation? The
answer to this question lies, in part, in the demonstrated strength
of the commitment to carry out the threat. Israel can enhance the
credibility of its threat by committing itself in advance to threat
fulfillment.
Here, a number of possibilities come immediately to mind.
One such possibility would involve the announcement of an
automatic system of nuclear reprisal, a firing procedure whereupon
computerized measures of particular thresholds of destruction
suffered by Israel would generate, without direct human interven-
tion, predetermined levels of nuclear retaliation. Such a "dooms-
day device," however, would carry with it enormous and intolerable
risks of computer or mechanical failure and associated risks of
enemy first-strikes. It does not warrant serious consideration.
Another more plausible and promising possibility could involve
open announcement of nuclear capability, a shift away from
"deliberate ambiguity" that would identify distinctly "usable"
f6rces.26  With such an announcement, a prospective attacker,
newly aware that Israel could retaliate without generating intolera-
bly high levels of civilian harms27 would be more likely to believe
Israel's nuclear threats.
Significantly, taking the bomb out of the "basement"' would
also strengthen the ability component of Israel's nuclear deterrence.
Operational benefits of disclosure would probably accrue from
deliberately-released information about dispersion, multiplication
and hardening of nuclear weapon systems, and about certain other
pertinent technical features of Israel's nuclear weapon systems.29
By removing doubts about Israel's nuclear force capabilities, an end
to deliberate ambiguity could enhance Israeli nuclear deterrence.
26. See BERES, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27. See Thomas W. Dowler & Joseph S. Howard II, Countering the Threat of
the Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons, 19
STRATEGIC REV. 34-40 (1991).
28. One way Israel might actually remove the bomb from the basement would
involve open testing of nuclear weapons. Significantly, in the aftermath of the
Cold War and the pre-Gulf War indifference of the United States to Iraqi and
Pakistani nuclearization, such testing might well be at minimal political cost.
Within the government of Israel, the policy of "deliberate ambiguity" was first
questioned after the Yom Kippur War, in 1976, when Moshe Dayan called for the
deployment of an overt nuclear force. See generally Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel's
Bomb in the Basement: A Second Look, ISRAEL AFF. (1996).
29. Id.
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Strictly speaking, removing the bomb from the Israeli base-
ment"0 would not constitute an irrevocable advance commitment
to threat fulfillment.3 1 After all, it is entirely conceivable that an
"announced" bomb would still not be used and that the shift from
deliberate ambiguity would be little more than an elaborate bluff.
Nevertheless, it is altogether likely that such a shift would reflect
a genuine sense of strategic urgency in Israel, and that Israel's
adversaries, especially Iran, would judge it accordingly.
3 2
These, then, are the basic features of "deadly logic," the
system of security through deterrence upon which Israel may
choose to depend. It is, however, a system that should provide
little cause for complaisance in Jerusalem because the ingredients
of a credible nuclear deterrence posture are extraordinarily
complex and problematic.
A nuclear weapons capability, defined to include nuclear
explosives, associated delivery vehicles, and supporting infrastruc-
ture, does not necessarily imply a credible deterrence posture.3 3
In fact, there exists no automatic connection between the two. In
spite of the enormous devastation that nuclear weapons are capable
of inflicting, threats of their retaliatory use will not always be be-
lieved.3 4 The persuasiveness of a retaliatory threat rests not only
upon the anticipated level of destruction, but also on the perceived
willingness or resolve to carry it out.35 Such willingness, as just
seen, may not always be a feature of Israel's nuclear threat.
Another problem of Israeli reliance upon nuclear deterrence
concerns the appearance of secure retaliatory forces. A secure
Israeli retaliatory force is an essential precondition of "assured
destruction., 36 Yet, there is no reason to believe that a would-be
30. The question of the "bomb in the basement" is examined exhaustively in
Beres, supra note 28, at 242.
31. This means that such removal would-not amount ipso facto to improved
nuclear deterrence. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. Whether or not a shift from ambiguity to disclosure would actually
enhance Israeli deterrence, would also depend on several other complex factors,
including the types of weapons involved, the reciprocal calculations of Iranian
leaders, the effects upon rational decision-making processes by these leaders and
the effects on both Israeli and Iranian command, control and communications
operations. If, for example, bringing Israel's bomb in the basement out into the
light were to result in Iranian predelegations of launch authority and/or new
launch-on-warning procedures, the likelihood of unauthorized and/or accidental
wars, including in the future, nuclear wars could be increased.
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attacker will always be prepared to make such a judgment.37
Significantly, however accurate or inaccurate the attacker's
judgment turns out to be regarding the vulnerability of Israel's
retaliatory forces, the decision to attack would signify the failure of
Israeli deterrence." Here, Israel's deterrent would prove unsuc-
cessful even though the Jewish State had actually possessed a
secure nuclear weapons capability.
A more immediate problem, of course, is that this capability
might not be sustainable. Because of its notably small size, Israel
might not be able to secure its nuclear forces within the limited
parameters of the country's green lines.39 Recognizing this, Israel
is apt to explore all available opportunities for sea-basing a portion
of its nuclear deterrent forces.4 But even such prudent efforts at
strengthening deterrence will not safeguard Israel from enemies
that do not conform to the rules of rationality in world politics.41
Faced with such enemies, Jerusalem's deterrence logic would, by
definition, be immobilized, leaving few reasonable alternatives to
prompt preemption against menacing hard targets. If Israel's
enemies cannot be deterred then preemption may be the only
alternative to being attacked.
Faced with an irrational adversary in Iran, Israel would have
no choice but to abandon reliance on traditional models of nuclear
deterrence.42 Here, preemption would become obligatory;43 the
37. Id.
38. Beres, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39. The green lines refer to Israel's pre-June 5, 1967, eastern border delineated
in the armistice agreements with Syria and Jordan, and its southern border with
the Gaza Strip in the armistice agreement with Egypt in the aftermath of the War
of Independence. The border line was colored green on the original maps drawn
up at Rhodes. See generally id.
40. This is because nuclear weapons deployed at sea provide significant
opportunities for more secure basing and reduced vulnerability. Id.
41. Deterrence depends always on the assumption of rationality. Id.
42. In considering the operation of nuclear deterrence and associated matters
of nuclear strategy, including preemption, it is vital to recall that such operation
impacts and determines the adequacy of pertinent international law. For example,
the adequacy of international law in preventing nuclear war in the Middle East
will depend not only upon certain treaties, customs and general principles, but also
upon the success or failure of particular country strategies in the region. If Israeli
strategy should reduce the threat of nuclear war, either because of successful forms
of nuclear deterrence or because of essential nonnuclear preemptive strikes, such
strategy must be considered an essential component of international law. Id.
43. Such preemptions would almost certainly be undertaken with conventional
(i.e., nonnuclear) weapons. It is extremely improbable that Israel would ever
decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances could arise
wherein such a strike would be perfectly rational, it is (hopefully) implausible that
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only questions would center on matters of timing, targeting, and
configuration of ordnance. Needless to say, the initial judgment
concerning Iranian definitions of "unacceptable damage"'  would
have to be made with great care. There is no room for error on
this judgment.
V. Preemption and International Law
Let Israel heed no "expert opinion" that such preemptive
attacks would be in violation of international law. International
law is not a suicide pact!45 Today, especially, in an age of unique-
Israel would allow itself to reach these dire circumstances. Moreover, unless the
nuclear weapons involved were used in a fashion consistent with the authoritative
norms of the laws of war, this form of preemption would clearly represent an
egregious violation of international law. And even if such consistency were
possible, the psychological and political impact on the world community would
be uniformly negative and far-reaching. It follows that an Israeli nuclear preemp-
tion could be expected only: (a) where Iran had acquired nuclear and/or other
unconventional weapons judged capable of destroying the Third Temple; (b)
where Iran had made clear that its intentions paralleled its capabilities; (c) where
Iran were believed ready to begin a "countdown to launch," and (d) where
Jerusalem believed that Israeli nonnuclear preemptions could not achieve needed
minimum levels of damage-limitation (i.e., levels consistent with preservation of
the Third Temple). Id.
44. Such definitions will be critical to successful deterrence. Beres, supra note
28 and accompanying text.
45. Let us recall here Pufendorf's argument in ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND
CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW:
... where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack
upon me, even though he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it
will be permitted at once to begin forcible self-defense, and to anticipate
him who is preparing mischief, provided there be no hope that, when
admonished in a friendly spirit, he may put off his hostile temper; or if
such admonition be likely to injure our cause. Hence, he is to be
regarded as the aggressor, who first conceived the wish to injure, and
prepared himself to carry it out. But the excuse of self-defense will be
his, who by quickness shall overpower his slower assailant. And for
defense, it is not required that one receive the first blow, or merely
avoid and parry those aimed at him.
See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING
TO NATURAL LAW 32 (Frank Gardner Moore trans., 1964).
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ly catastrophic weaponry,4 6 the law of nations47 does not require
46. There now exists a huge literature dealing with such weaponry and with
the expected consequences of a nuclear war. For works on these consequences by
this author, see BERES, supra note 25 and accompanying text; MIMICKING
SISYPHUS: AMERICA'S COUNTERVAILING NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1983); REASON
AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (1984); BERES,
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
47. On the "nuclear regime" under international law, including the anti-
proliferation measures, see Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S.
No. 4780,402 U.N.T.S. 71; The Memorandum of Understanding Between the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of
a Direct Communication Link, June 20, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No. 5362, 472
U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hot Line Agreement]; The Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963,
14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Partial Test Ban
Treaty]; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967,634 U.N.T.S. 326 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlateloco];
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]; Treaty
on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,
opened for signature Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S.
115 [hereinafter Seabed Arms Control Treaty]; Agreement on Measures to Reduce
the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, Sept. 30, 1971, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 22 U.S.T. 1590,
T.I.A.S. No. 7186, 807 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Accident Measures Agreement];
Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7187, 806 U.N.T.S. 402
[hereinafter Modernization Agreement]; Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503,
944 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]; Interim Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures
with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972,23 U.S.T.
3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, 94 U.N.T.S. 3; Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
May 29, 1972, 66 DEPT. STATE BULL. 898; Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 12, 1974, 71 DEPT. STATE BULL. 217;
Limitation on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty Protocol, July 3, 1974, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276; the Joint Statement on the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms [hereinafter Vladivostok Agreement], Apr. 29, 1974, 70
DEPT. STATE BULL. 677; Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, Aug., 1, 1975, DEP'T STATE PUB. No. 8826 (Gen. Foreign Pol. Ser.
298) [hereinafter Helsinki Accords]; Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/20
Annex I (1979) [hereinafter the Moon Treaty]; South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440; Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermedi-
ate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, 88 DEPT. STATE BULL. 24
(Feb. 1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty]. See also the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty and
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Israel to wait for its own annihilation."
For many years, Israel has sought to survive by utilization of
diplomatic remedies. 49 In January 1993, Israel became a charter
signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), while
Egypt, Syria and most other states in the area rejected the
Treaty. °  Israel ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1964.51
It is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and has safeguard agreements for several minor facilities.52 It has
consistently supported the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
for the Middle East (MENWFZ),53 and on September -13, 1993, it
signed a formal peace agreement with the Palestine Liberation
Organization 4
In 1987, the United States and six other industrialized states
formed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).55
Nevertheless, MTCR did nothing to prevent Iraq from upgrading
its Scud-B missiles, with technology and assistance from such
Protocol on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976,
74 DEPT. STATE BULL. 802 (1976); Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the SALT II Treaty, June 18, 1979, S.
EXEC. DOC. Y, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1979).
48. For those who might seek even more specific guidance under international
law, it can be argued persuasively that because a state of war exists between Israel
and Iran (at Iran's insistence), the Jewish State does not even need to meet the
requirements of anticipatory self-defense. Instead, as there can be no authentic
"first strike" in an ongoing belligerency, an Israeli attack would need only to fulfill
the expectations of the laws of war, i.e., the rules of discrimination, proportionali-
ty and military necessity. A legal state of war can exist between two states
irrespective of the presence or absence of ongoing hostilities between national
armed forces. The principle affirming that the existence of a legal state of war
depends upon the intentions of one or more of the states involved, and not on
"objective" phenomena, is known variously as the "state of war" doctrine, "dejure
war," "war in the -legal sense," and "war in the sense of international law."
49. See infra note 57-61 and accompanying text.
50. See Gerald M. Steinberg, The History of Arms Control in the Middle East,
in ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT GLASNOST: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE




54. This Agreement flows formally from the Madrid Process, which began with
the U.S. - Soviet Letter of Invitation to the Peace Talks in Madrid of Oct. 18,
1992 and resulted in the Cairo Agreement of Feb. 9, 1994. From the standpoint
of international law, the Oslo Agreement is not a treaty. According to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty I.C. is always an international
agreement "concluded between States. .. ." See U.N. Doc. AICONF. 39/27, at
289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
55. See Steinberg, supra note 50.
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signatories as Germany, Great Britain, and the United States.5 6
Moreover, as Gerald M. Steinberg points out, U.S. policies may
already have impacted Israeli capabilities adversely:
In 1990, after the U.S. Congress enacted the Missile Technology
Control Act, creating penalties for foreign firms that violate
MTCR guidelines, the Bush administration's first target was not
North Korea, Syria, Iran or Iraq, but Israel. Under the threat
of sanctions, Israel has been forced to accept the terms of the
MTCR with no comparable limits on the threat which Israel
faces. Moreover, Israel has also been excluded from receiving
any of the benefits that go with membership in the MTCR
system. No sanctions were imposed on Germany and other
Western European states that allowed shipments of missile
technology to Iraq.
5 7
A structural aspect of MTCR that is problematic for Israel is
its definition of nuclear-capable missiles. The MTCR focuses
narrowly on those missiles having a range of at least 300 km and a
payload capability of at least 500 kg.58 In the Middle East,
however, enemy States are very close together, making shorter-
range missiles strategically significant.
For Israel, arms control remedies are fraught with intolerable
risk. Although the Jewish State is assuredly committed to the
control of force through law,59 it must temper this commitment
with an overriding obligation to survive. No diplomatic agreement
that would place the Third Temple' in jeopardy could conceivably
be binding.61  The overriding importance of survival under
international law was even recognized by Thomas Jefferson.
56. Id.
57. See GERALD M. STEINBERG, ARMS CONTROL AND ISRAELI NATIONAL
SECURITY: A REALISTIC APPROACH 8 (1993).
58. Id.
59. This is especially apparent since the implementation of the Oslo Accords.
60. In Jewish-historical terms, the "Third Temple" signifies the current State
of Israel and the "End of the Third Temple" refers to the destruction of this
current State. The First Jewish Temple, or commonwealth, was destroyed by the
Babylonians (ancestors of present-day Iraqis) in 586 B.C. The Second Temple was
destroyed by the Romans in the year 70 A.D.
61. A jurisprudential theory, following Hegelian ideas, is that any treaty
obligation may be terminated unilaterally following changes in conditions that
make performance of the treaty injurious to fundamental rights, especially the
rights of existence, self-preservation and independence. These rights have been
summarized in law as "rights of necessity." See ARiE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY
OF TREATY TERMINATION 19 (1975); LAW OF TREATIES, 29 AM. JUR. INT'L L.
666, 1100 (1935).
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Thomas Jefferson, who was familiar with Epicurus, Cicero, and
Seneca, as well as with Voltaire, Montesquieu, Holbach, Helvetius,
and Beccaria, wrote as follows about limits to obligation under
international law:
The Moral duties which exist between individual and individual
in a state of nature, accompany them into a state of society and
the aggregate of the duties of all the individuals composing the
society constitutes the duties of that society towards any other,
so that between society and society the same moral duties exist
as did between the individuals composing them while in an
unassociated state, their maker not having released them from
those duties on their forming themselves into a nation.
Compacts then between nation and nation are obligatory on
them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to
observe their compacts. There are circumstances however
which sometimes excuse the non-performance of contracts
between man and man; so are there also between nation and
nation. When performance, for instance, becomes impossible,non-performance is not immoral. So if performance becomes
self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation
overrules the laws of obligation to others.62
Pacta sunt servanda! - States must comply in good faith with
their treaty obligations. The problem with this peremptory63
norm of international law is that it reflects altogether erroneous
assumptions about cooperation and comity in world affairs. Such
assumptions are especially erroneous in the Middle East.
The state of nations, within which international law operates,
remains a state of nature. Since the end of the Thirty Years War
62. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the French Treaties, in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113-14 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1993). Later,
Jefferson concludes: "As every treaty ought to be made by a sufficient power, a
treaty pernicious to the state is null, and not at all obligatory; no governor of a
nation having power to engage things capable of destroying the state, for the safety
of which the empire is trusted to him. The nation itself, bound necessarily to
whatever its preservation and safety require, cannot enter into engagements
contrary to its indispensable obligations." Id at 115.
63. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
... a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." See Article 53,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, May 22, 1969, opened for
signature, May 23, 1969, UN. Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second
Sessions, Mar. 26-May 24 1968, and April 9-May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.
39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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and the resulting Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the states in world
politics have coexisted uneasily without a specially-created world
government.64 As a result, each state, in the final analysis, contin-
ues to depend upon expressions of national power in order to
survive. Without such expressions, which are at the heart of what
is commonly known as Realpolitik,65 weaker states can endure
only at the pleasure of the strong.' For Israel, weakness could
produce genocide.67
VI. The Legacy of Osiraq
This understanding, that weakness could produce genocide, is
not unprecedented for the Jewish State. On June 7, 1981, Israeli
fighter-bombers destroyed Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor before it
was ready to go "on line."'  At that time, the global community
reaction was overwhelmingly negative.69 Even the U.N. Security
Council, in Resolution 487 of June 19, 1981, indicated that it




67. For writings by this author on the subject of genocide, see Louis RENt
BERES, AMERICA OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY (1987); REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD
ORDER (1984); After the Gulf War: Iraq, Genocide and International Law, 69 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 13 (1991); Genocide and Genocide-Like Crimes, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 271 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986); Genocide
and Power Politics: The Individual and the State, 18 BULL. OF PEACE PROPOSALS
73 (1987); Genocide, Law and Power Politics, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 329 (1988);
Genocide, State and Self, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 37 (1989); International
Law, Personhood and the Prevention of Genocide, 11 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 25 (1989);
Justice and Realpolitik: International Law and the Prevention of Genocide, 33 AM.
J. JURIS. 123 (1988); Reason and Realpolitik: International Law and the Prevention
of Genocide, 30 CHITr'YS L.J. 223 (1982); Punishing Genocide and Crimes Against
Humanity After the Gulf War: Iraqi Crimes and International Law 41 (1992) (on
file with the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva).
68. For more information on this event, see GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, THE
IRAQI NUCLEAR THREAT: WHY ISRAEL HAD TO ACT (1981); H. Grumm, 4
Safeguards and Tammuz: Setting the Record Straight, 23 IAEA BULL. 10-14
(1981); Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities: Hearings before Committee of
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, and
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-57 (1981)
(testimony of Roger Richter, former inspector, IAEA); AMOS PERLMUTrER, Two
MINUTES OVER BAGHDAD (1982); Shai Feldman, The Bombing of Osiraq
Revisited, 7 INT'L SEC. 114 (1982); Roger F. Pajak, Nuclear Status and Policies of
the Middle East Countries, 59 INT'L AFF. 596 (1983).
69. See Louis Ren6 Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's
Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. 437-49
(1996).
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"strongly condemns" the attack and that "Iraq is entitled to
appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered."70
Yet, Israel certainly did not act illegally at Osiraq. Its inherent
right to anticipatory self-defense was especially compelling. Faced
with mass destruction weapons in the hands of an enemy state, an
unwillingness to preempt would have carried high risks of annihila-
tion. Thus, Israel did not commit aggression at Osiraq. Iraq has
always insisted that a state of war exists with the "Zionist enti-
ty."72  It follows that because aggression cannot be committed
against a state with which a country is already at war, Jerusalem
could not possibly have been guilty of such a "crime against
peace.""
Israel did not violate international laws of war at Osiraq.
Fourteen Israeli aircraft took part in the raid, eight F-16 Falcons,
each carrying two 1000-kilogram bombs and six F-15 Eagles serving
as escort planes.74 The reactor was completely destroyed, without
civilian casualties and before any radiation dangers existed.75
Unlike Iraq's thirty-nine Scud attacks on Israel during the Gulf
War,76 which were designed expressly to harm innocent civilians,
Israel's raid on Osiraq was conceived for the protection of civilians.
Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Iraq has
been openly committed to destroying the Jewish State. Baghdad
70. See KAREL C. WELLENS ED., RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 351-52 (1990). This Resolution was
adopted unanimously.
71. For authoritative positions supporting the particular reasonableness of
anticipatory self-defense in the nuclear age, see LOUIS HENKIN ET. AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 933 (1980) (citing WOLFGANG
FRIEDMANN, THE THREAT OF TOTAL DESTRUCTION AND SELF-DEFENSE 259-60
(1964); JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET. AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1460-61 (3rd ed. 1988) (citing Myres McDougal, The
Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598 (1963).
72. This is the term used generally for Israel in the Arab World.
73. Crimes Against Peace are defined in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
74. See Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 69.
75. Id.
76. On Friday, Jan. 18, 1991, eight Scud missiles were fired at Tel-Aviv by
Saddam Hussein's government in Baghdad. This attack was followed by the firing
of thirty-one additional Scuds, directed exclusively at civilian populations in Israel.
Iraq's last missile attack against Israel took place on February 25, 1991. For an
authoritative assessment of the Scud toll from the 39 missile attacks, see SCUD
Toll: Summing Up the 39 Missile Attacks, JERUSALEM POST (Int'l Edition), Mar.
9, 1991, at 3. See also by this author, Prosecuting Iraqi Gulf War Crimes: Allied
and Israeli Rights Under International Law, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
41 (1992).
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joined several other Arab states attacking Israel on the very day of
its declared independence." But while Egypt," Lebanon, Jor-
dan, and Syria proceeded to sign armistice agreements with Israel
in 1949, 79 Iraq always steadfastly insisted upon a permanent state
of belligerency."
All things considered, Israel's defensive strike against an
enemy state preparing for extermination warfare was distinctly law-
enforcing. In the absence of a centralized enforcement capability,
international law must rely upon the willingness of individual states
to act on behalf of the entire global community."' This is exactly
what took place on June 7, 1981, when, with surgical precision,
Jerusalem's fighter-bombers precluded an Iraqi nuclear option. 2
77. Iraq also sent expeditionary forces during the Six Day War (1967) and the
Yom Kippur War (1973). During the 1948 War, Baghdad's forces entered
TransJordan and engaged Israeli forces in Western Samaria. After the 1967 War,
Iraqi forces, then deployed in Jordan, remained there for more than two years.
During the 1973 War, Baghdad committed about one-third of its then 95,000 man
armed forces to assist Syria in its campaign against the IDF on the Golan.
78. Egypt and Jordan have now both entered into formal treaties of peace
with Israel. Regarding Egypt, however, contrary to widespread belief, its treaty
does not constrain Cairo from joining with other Arab states against the Jewish
State. A minute to Article VI, paragraph 5, of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty
provides that it is agreed to by the parties that there is no assertion that the Peace
Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements, or that -other treaties or
agreements prevail over the Peace Treaty. See TREATY OF PEACE, Egypt-Israel,
Mar. 26, 1979, Minute to Art. VI (5), 18 I.L.M. 362, 392.
79. These general armistice agreements were negotiated bilaterally between
Israel and Egypt: Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Israel-Egypt, 42 U.N.T.S.
251-70; Israel and Lebanon, Armistice Agreement, Mar. 23, 1949, Israel-Lebanon,
42 U.N.T.S. 287-98; Israel and Jordan, Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, Israel-
Jordan, 42 U.N.T.S. 303-20; Israel and Syria, Armistice Agreement, July 10, 1949,
Israel-Syria, 42 U.N.T.S. 327-40. Under international law, a general armistice is
a war convention, an agreement or contract concluded between belligerents. Such
an agreement does not result in the termination of a state of war. The 1907
Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
stipulates, at the Annex to the Convention, that "an armistice suspends military
operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties." Convention No.
IV of The Hague Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277
(Oct. 18, 1907).
80. This is manifest even today with Iraq's explicit commitment to remain
outside the Middle East Peace process.
81. This conclusion is necessarily implied by the premises; i.e., it is the
inevitable deduction from the structural context of world law.
82. See Statement by former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney on Oct. 28,
1991, in Avi BEKER, DENUCLEARIZATION WITHOUT GLASNOST 161-62 (1993).
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VII. Conclusion
"In the end," says the poet Goethe, "we depend upon
creatures of our own making."' 3 Understood in terms of Israel's
security options vis-A-vis Iran, the poet's wisdom suggests a willing-
ness to consider all strategic options, including life-saving, and
ultimately law-enforcing, forms of preemption. Aware that. the
Jewish State remains embedded in "protracted conflict,"' and that
little hope can be expected from the vaunted peace process,
Jerusalem must be prepared to look everywhere, all at once. In the
fashion of Janus,85 a god of another ancient enemy, Israel must
now look in all directions simultaneously, poised always for
diplomatic options, but prepared also to strike first, lawfully, in
essential self-defense.
83. From an aphorism by the great German poet.
84. The idea of Israel as a state embedded in "protracted conflict" is hardly
new. Yitzhak Rabin coined the term "dormant war" in the 1960s to describe
Israel's situation when not engaged in active hostilities. Amnon Rubinstein, the
leader of the centrist Shinui Party, wrote: "It is Israel's fate to live in a hostile
world that refuses to accept her and to see her as part of the Middle East reality."
Moshe Arens, a Likud leader and former defense minister, regarded the Middle
East as a region where war was endemic. For Ariel Sharon, a long-term enduring
peace for Israel was "nothing but a dream." Similarly, Yuval Neeman, the leader
of the Tehiya Party, regarded Middle East wars as a product of historical
conditions similar to those that had existed in Europe for hundreds of years.
Neeman and other, therefore, were arguing that Israel must reconcile itself to a
situation of protracted or unending war, at least for the foreseeable future. On
these views, see Efraim Inbar, Attitudes Toward War in the Israeli Political Elite,
44 MIDDLE E.J. 431-45 (1990).
85. Janus was the ancient Roman god of doors and gates; hence, of all
beginnings. His symbol is the double-faced head, Janus is usually represented with
two heads placed back-to-back so that he might look in two directions simulta-
neously.
